Epstein files reveal Turkey's final ultimatum to Assad before Syrian war
A confidential document detailing a 2011 phone conversation between former Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and then–UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon about the Syrian crisis was found among documents belonging to convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein.
It is not immediately clear how Epstein came into possession of the correspondence, a "strictly confidential" UN document recording the secretary-general’s official minutes of a meeting with the Turkish foreign minister on 16 August 2011.
Epstein, a financier who is said to have died by suicide in prison, appears to have been well connected to senior politicians and intelligence figures over many years, with some suspecting he had ties to Israeli intelligence agencies.
The phone conversation took place at the height of the Syrian crisis, as former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was deliberating how to respond to growing anti-government protests around the city of Hama.
Assad ultimately responded with a bloody crackdown at the start of Ramadan in late July 2011, a key escalation in the fast-unfolding crisis.
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According to the document, Davutoglu told the UN secretary-general that he had met Assad in January of that year and urged him to implement reforms.
"Assad had agreed, but had not done anything," he said.
In April, Davutoglu went back to Syria and presented Assad with a list of reforms he needed to implement immediately.
"The president had agreed, and had even made a public speech describing the reforms he would take, but again, he had done nothing," Davutoglu said.
Warning Assad
Before the Syrian civil war, Turkey's then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Assad had very close, cordial relations, and it took months for Ankara to adjust its stance toward Damascus.
Davutoglu also informed Ban Ki-moon about his visit to Syria the previous week, a trip that later became widely known in Turkey for prompting a major shift in the country’s policy towards its neighbour.
"The Foreign Minister had met with President Assad for six hours, three and a half of which were spent in tête-à-tête," the document said.
"Davutoglu said that nobody could understand why Assad would launch a military operation on Hama, a densely populated town, during the holy Muslim month."
The Syrian president defended his actions, saying that armed groups had killed several police officers, which justified the deployment of the military to the town.
Davutoglu said that nobody believed Assad’s narrative of the Hama attack and that the only way to regain credibility was to allow an international commission into the city.
"During the tête-à-tête, the Foreign Minister had told the President that he had two alternatives: The first alternative was to implement reforms that he needed to announce immediately, with a strict timetable," the document said.
"The second alternative was to continue like this, but that this would lead to the international community isolating him, like Saddam Hussein and Colonel [Muammar] Gaddafi were isolated. The Security Council was worried. Several members had been calling Turkey seeking their advice."
Davutoglu advised Assad to withdraw tanks from Hama, let international media in, make significant legal reforms, and conduct elections for a new parliament that would draft a new constitution. Davutoglu warned that the Syrian president would need to be ready to leave power.
'If Assad didn't make his speech and didn't implement the roadmap, [Davutoglu] was worried. Turkey would not stay silent anymore'
– Document in Epstein files
The document suggests that Assad initially followed through on the measures he had agreed to, withdrawing tanks from Hama and allowing the Turkish ambassador to visit and observe developments in the town. However, he later reversed course.
"Secretary [Hillary] Clinton and President [Barack] Obama had been in contact with the Turkish Government to inform them that President Obama was about to make a speech on Thursday in which he would call for Assad's departure," the document added.
"Prime Minister Erdogan had called President Assad to express his concerns about the situation and to encourage him to make his speech as soon as possible."
Erdogan told Assad that Sunday would be too late, as his credibility would already be undermined by Obama’s speech just days before.
"Davutoglu indicated that if Assad didn't make his speech and didn't implement the roadmap, he was worried," the document said. "Turkey would not stay silent anymore."
Following the conversation and the failure to achieve a peaceful resolution, Turkey adopted a confrontational approach towards Assad, later supporting Syrian rebel groups that sought to topple him.
'Not for email'
Other correspondence in the Epstein files indicates that the financier had an interest in Syria and Assad's fate, regularly receiving reports and analyses on the situation in the country.
On 21 October 2015, Japanese entrepreneur and venture capitalist Joi Ito emailed Epstein, requesting his help in freeing someone in Syria.
"I'm trying to get a friend out of prison in Syria. You don't happen to have anyone with influence over Assad, do you?" Ito wrote.
Epstein responded: "Not for email."
The UN document also outlines the remainder of Davutoglu's conversation. It includes details of Turkish-Israeli negotiations in 2011 following the killing of Turkish citizens aboard the Mavi Marmara, which had attempted to break the Gaza blockade in 2010.
Davutoglu said that despite the Mavi Marmara crisis, Turkey sought to continue mediating between Israelis and Palestinians. He also referenced the deal reached with Israel, which included a full apology, compensation for those killed, and a channel for Turkish aid agencies to deliver more food and equipment to Gaza.
"If Israel didn't accept the agreement, they would take the next steps, which were very clear: they would challenge the legality of the blockade at the ICJ, support the victims in any tribunal in the world, close the Embassy in Tel Aviv, and send their navy to the Mediterranean 'to show the Israelis that the sea didn't belong to them,'" Davutoglu said, according to the document.
"The US Secretary of State and President were both working hard to convince the Israelis to accept the agreement."
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