How Egypt's new political party will deepen state repression

Several former state officials and public figures met last month with Egyptian businessman Ibrahim al-Organi, the head of a Sinai militia and an emerging political figure, to discuss establishing a new party. It was formally launched at the end of December.

The party’s stated aim is to act as the political arm of the Union of Arab Tribes, the regime-sanctioned militia led by Organi. The militia was heavily involved in the state’s counterinsurgency campaign in Sinai, which was riddled with human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, the use of heavy weapons in civilian areas, and mass expulsions. 

The new party, dubbed the National Front, was launched from Egypt’s New Administrative Capital, the Sisi regime’s most symbolic project, to much fanfare. Its founding members include a diverse array of public figures, parliamentarians and former ministers. 

Among them are Assem el-Gazzar, the secretary general of the Union of Arab Tribes, and Organi’s son Essam. The new party clearly has the full endorsement of the Egyptian government, with its launch occurring in the regime’s centre of power and drawing heavy coverage from state-controlled media.

The creation of this party is a watershed moment in the development of Egypt’s political system under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi - and an ominous sign of what lies ahead.

In effect, the National Front is a political party that is organically connected to a state-sanctioned paramilitary group with an atrocious record of human rights abuses. This will have grievous consequences for the country.

Among the most notable impacts is the regime’s doubling down on its policy of failing to develop a genuine civilian political party, which could provide a base for stabilising the regime, or even reforming it from within.  

No prospects for reform

While parliament is dominated by the pro-Sisi Nation’s Future party, there is no evidence that it plays any significant role in policymaking, nor does it occupy important positions in the state apparatus. Instead of creating a new party to fill that role, the regime has instead opted to create one for a militia with no apparent popular base. The prospects for reform will thus remain absent for the foreseeable future. 

This development also brings to a close the regime’s attempts to fabricate a pro-regime youth political elite that could play a role in propping up the government - attempts that were not that serious to begin with.  

Rather than opting for reforms to avoid possible popular unrest, the regime is doubling down on its policy of hardline repression

But this does not mean the status quo will continue. On the contrary, the rise of Organi and his new party represents a dangerous and radical shift, granting a regional militia access to national political power. This could open the doors for Organi and his allies to penetrate the state apparatus, already damaged by heavy militarisation. 

If this new party comes to dominate parliament, which would be a reasonable assumption, then a new type of regime-allied political elite could emerge on the national scene. Behind the ex-ministers and public figures, militiamen may come to the fore as a nationally powerful political force - second only to the military itself, the undisputed hegemon of Egyptian politics. 

This is not to argue that Organi and his allies would take control of, or even participate in, policymaking; this would likely remain firmly in the hands of the military establishment, even as the new party penetrated the national political system.

But as the political arm of a state-sanctioned militia, the new party would likely extend the government’s heavy reliance on state violence to further repress dissent.

Safe bet for Sisi's regime

Indeed, as Organi continues to accumulate political power and his businesses grow, his stakes in the regime’s survival increase. It is thus highly likely that in a case of mass unrest, the regime would rely on his militia to repress opposition, bypassing the possibility of defections among the Egyptian army in a popular cross-class uprising.

Organi’s militia would be more likely to remain loyal to the regime, considering its composition of tribesmen from Sinai who have already committed a litany of crimes against civilians from their own region. 

In the case of a mass uprising similar to 2011, the use of these militia forces would thus be a safer bet for the regime. In other words, the regime would not only diversify its repressive apparatus, but also potentially leverage Egypt’s regional differences by bringing in a militia from the country’s periphery to repress dissent in the core - divide-and-rule tactics at their finest.

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The new party’s nature as a pure vehicle for power accumulation can be gleaned by its apolitical character and lack of an ideological stance. This became apparent when journalist Diaa Rashwan, a founding member of the party, remarked that it was “neither loyal nor opposition, nor is it a single school of thought”. He added that at this stage, Egypt needed a “unifying entity” to develop the country’s political life. 

These all appear to be euphemisms, denoting a party whose sole purpose is to support the regime, while remaining consistent with a chauvinistic form of nationalism that views the Egyptian people as one organic unit. The country would thus effectively have a one-party system, encompassing those who support the regime in an overarching entity that aims to depoliticise Egypt’s political system.     

The emergence of the National Front can ultimately be seen as a continuation of the regime’s primary imperative and overriding goal: namely, staying in power at all costs. 

Rather than opting for reforms to avoid possible popular unrest, the regime is doubling down on its policy of hardline repression, economic mismanagement, and power centralisation in the hands of the military. The debt crisis engulfing the country is making the regime even more repressive and resistant to liberalisation. 

This opens up a dark and terrifying scenario, wherein mass state violence against urban centres is unleashed not only by official security organs, but also by a militia that is likely to be more brutal than anything Egypt has ever seen.                    

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.