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Egypt: How Sisi's decade of failure could spur his political demise

Amid economic mismanagement and diminishing regional influence, the state may soon find itself at a profound crossroads
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi attends a G20 session in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on 19 November 2024 (Mauro Pimentel/AFP)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi attends a G20 session in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on 19 November 2024 (Mauro Pimentel/AFP)

Since President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi assumed power in Egypt in 2014 after a military coup the previous year, the country has undergone profound economic, security and political transformations. 

Despite the evident deterioration in all areas, the Egyptian people have not risen up against his regime, prompting questions about the reasons for this stability.

On the security front, Sisi has relied on strict media censorship, control over the judiciary, and widespread arrests of opposition figures. To ensure control over the military, he implemented a policy of regular transfers to prevent the emergence of personal loyalties or power centres. 

This strategy drew upon lessons from past mistakes, such as the tensions between former President Gamal Abdel Nasser and his defence chief, Abdel Hakim Amer; and the prolonged tenure of Mohamed Hussein Tantawi as defence minister under former President Hosni Mubarak, which allowed him to build power networks and ultimately play a role in Mubarak’s 2011 removal.

Sisi’s consolidation of power relies on five main pillars: using military intelligence as a security tool, replacing political parties with coalitions, establishing alternative structures to the official state bureaucracy, giving the military sweeping control over the economy, and introducing new laws to sideline opposition. 

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The dominance of military intelligence began in earnest during the 2011 uprising, marking its first involvement in public affairs traditionally managed by the General Intelligence Service (GIS).

After the July 2013 coup, Sisi focused on dismantling loyalties within the GIS and transferring its responsibilities to military intelligence. This ensured that the GIS, which could potentially act against him, was neutralised. Abbas Kamel, Sisi’s former chief of staff, was appointed to oversee the GIS, facilitating purges of senior officials.

Economic undermining

This restructuring was driven by concerns about leaks regarding the security sector’s control over media, and allegations of its involvement in an assassination attempt targeting Egypt’s former defence and interior ministers in 2017. Accusations also surfaced about GIS support for former presidential candidate Sami Anan, and opposition to key decisions, such as ceding the Tiran and Sanafir islands to Saudi Arabia

Sisi eventually placed his son in a prominent position within the GIS, further consolidating familial control, and reassigned another son to oversee the telecommunications sector.

In the economic realm, Sisi expanded the military’s role to encompass multiple sectors, including infrastructure and food production. This transformation turned the military into the backbone of the state, not only as a security force but also as a primary economic actor. By monopolising economic projects and sidelining the private sector, Sisi’s policies have discouraged foreign investment.

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Unlike Mubarak’s reliance on privatisation, foreign investment, and a relatively robust private sector that contributed to job creation, Sisi’s approach has undermined these elements. Mubarak’s system maintained a delicate balance among the military, businesspeople and the bureaucratic elite, allowing the middle class to adapt to political and social developments. 

Under Sisi, however, unplanned and economically draining mega-projects, combined with austerity measures dictated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have worsened the economic crisis and increased public debt.

Politically, Sisi has displayed a clear disdain for political parties, opting instead for coalitions orchestrated by security agencies. Similar to Nasser, who dissolved political parties during the early days of his rule in the 1950s, Sisi has openly opposed political organisations. This is evident in the arrests of legitimate political leaders, such as Abdul Moneim Aboul Fotouh, head of the Strong Egypt Party.

But the coalitions formed under Sisi lack the organisational coherence of the former National Democratic Party (NDP). The NDP fostered networks of loyalty among political and economic elites, served as a political shield for the government, and acted as a mediator between the state and society. 

Sisi has failed to establish a similar system, leaving him without a political base capable of managing public sentiment or elections effectively. As a result, political processes, including constitutional amendments and elections, are widely perceived as lacking legitimacy and professionalism.

Security compromised

On the international front, Sisi’s policies have significantly harmed Egypt’s national security and strategic depth. His alignment with Gulf states, particularly the UAE, has come at the expense of Egypt’s long-term interests. His support for renegade general Khalifa Haftar in Libya exemplifies how regional interventions have compromised Egypt’s security.

Additionally, Sisi’s concessions over Egypt’s historical share of Nile waters, and the transfer of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi Arabia, have further weakened the country’s regional standing. 

On the Palestinian cause, Egypt has relinquished its historic leadership role, adopting a marginal position limited to mediating without neutrality. Sisi’s alliance with the UAE, which spearheads normalisation efforts in the region, has diminished Egypt’s credibility as a defender of Palestinian rights.

A continuation of economic hardships could spark another uprising, compelling the military to intervene and remove Sisi

The internationalisation of Egypt’s internal issues, such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, has further complicated the country’s ability to resolve strategic challenges independently, leaving it vulnerable to external pressures.

Amid growing public discontent, several scenarios could shape Egypt’s future. If Sisi continues his current policies - selling strategic assets, implementing austerity measures and suppressing dissent - immediate uprisings could be staved off, but this would come with the risk of long-term instability.

Secondly, the military could intervene to prevent further economic decline, either through a negotiated agreement with Sisi or a coup. Pressure from the IMF to increase transparency in military-owned businesses may force the military’s hand, as it faces challenges reconciling these demands with its interests.

Finally, we could see mass protests that lead to change. A continuation of economic hardships could spark another uprising, compelling the military to intervene and remove Sisi. But the military’s diminished public standing complicates its ability to restore stability.

Sisi’s tenure has been marked by authoritarian consolidation, economic mismanagement, and diminishing regional influence. Without substantive reforms, the regime’s structural vulnerabilities could lead to its eventual collapse, leaving Egypt at a crossroads of profound political and social transformation.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

Taqadum al-Khatib is a PhD scholar at Princeton University and Berlin free University. He is also the former coordinator of the political communications dossier with the Egyptian National Association for Change.
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