Israel's annexation drive has sped up - because the world allows it
While the world debates statements of condemnation over Israel’s policy in the occupied West Bank, mulling whether annexation will proceed, Israel is already implementing its decision on the ground: expelling communities, confiscating land, and transferring powers from the army to civil authorities.
Yet even after two years of an ongoing genocide in Gaza, there are still people around the world who believe Israel is deterred by international condemnations.
They choose, consciously or unconsciously, to ignore a simple reality: as long as there is no meaningful force standing in the way of Israeli policy, it will move towards further conquests - and it is doubtful that this process will stop at the occupied West Bank and Gaza alone.
Israel’s plan accelerated this week, as the cabinet approved an initial budget of around 244 million shekels ($79m) to establish a mechanism for land registration in Area C of the occupied West Bank. Current landowners will have to prove ownership, and if they can’t, the land will be registered by the Israeli state.
The move came amid a slew of recent decisions, including repealing a Jordanian-era law that prevented the sale of land to Israelis; applying Israeli civilian law in the occupied West Bank, in violation of international law; transferring authority over the Ibrahimi Mosque from the Hebron municipality to the Israeli civil administration; increasing Israeli control in Areas A and B by shifting authority away from the Palestinian leadership; and further expanding the settlement enterprise.
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Naturally, Arab states have condemned this policy shift. But after the genocide in Gaza - and in the Trump era, where military and economic discourse sets the tone - Israel has come to understand that beyond empty statements, there will be no meaningful response in terms of sanctions, severing ties, or cancelling trade and arms agreements.
Worse still, in a nonstop news cycle, it is likely that by next week, the world will be focused elsewhere, perhaps on another crime Israel has committed - whether in the occupied West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, or even a war with Iran.
Deepening the occupation
Even if we examine Israeli policy in the occupied West Bank before the genocide in Gaza began, we find a steady, gradual strategy aimed at deepening the occupation and creating facts on the ground. From before the Oslo Accords all the way up to the past week, the one meaningful difference is in how Israel reads the international mood.
To understand this progression fully, it must be analysed through a historical and legal lens. The occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1967 brought with it a legal culture in which the Israeli judiciary mobilised to provide a legal framework for military measures and land seizures in occupied territory, while offering protection to generals and soldiers.
In 1979, for example, Israel’s High Court provided an interpretation of an Ottoman-era law, arguing that public land not under private ownership or active use could be classified as “state land” - despite the fact that Israel has no right to declare occupied territory that is not privately owned or cultivated as its own.
It is no longer a question of whether it is possible to establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank, when faced with the legal and military realities on the ground
Fast-forward to the Oslo Accords and the division of the occupied West Bank into Areas A, B and C, the former two of which constitute only 40 percent of the West Bank’s territory while housing around three million Palestinians. Area C, meanwhile, constitutes 60 percent of the territory and is home to around 300,000 Palestinians.
Today, as Israel moves to complete the annexation of Area C and continue on towards the remaining areas, a broad historical perspective shows that the current government is merely accelerating an old Israeli strategy. The only thing that has changed is how the international arena operates.
In the first decades of the occupation, the global community gave greater weight to international law, and Israel’s policy was more calculated - especially amid the First Intifada, which emerged during a global campaign against one of Israel’s closest allies at the time, the apartheid regime of South Africa, and coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
These international developments reshaped the global order, which became less militarised, as global discourse increasingly shifted towards liberal-democratic language and economic growth.
If we examine Oslo through this lens, it can be understood as a historic Israeli achievement. Since then, the number of Israeli settlers has risen from around 300,000 to roughly 800,000 today.
Through the agreement, more and more Arab states strengthened ties with Israel through normalisation processes. The Palestinian Authority (PA) assumed responsibility for administering Palestinian civil life, and for policing society in close coordination with Israel. And the same figure portrayed globally as a dove of peace - former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin - proposed the construction of the apartheid wall, later used by the occupation to seize more land.
Systematic violations
The current discourse on annexation, including the international condemnations, deliberately ignores the past three decades. The current Israeli government understands very well that there is no reason to even attempt to legally justify its actions in the occupied West Bank - because there is simply no need.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in a 2024 advisory opinion, ruled that Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, was no longer a temporary and “legitimate” situation under the law of occupation. Instead, it has become a prolonged regime accompanied by systematic violations of international law.
The court noted that Israel’s settlement policy, de facto annexation, demographic and legal transformation, and denial of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination rendered its presence unlawful. The ICJ thus found that Israel has an obligation to end the occupation, while other states have a duty not to aid in maintaining it.
But nothing fundamentally changed after the ruling. While the Arab world remains stagnant in its response, Israel is dynamic in its decisions. Again, this is not only about the current government, but about a consistent Israeli policy that adapts itself to the world and to the present moment - with broad public support.
When we look at the number of Israelis living in occupied territory - roughly 10 percent of the state’s citizens - it is no longer a matter of a small religious-nationalist minority. Settlers come from across Israeli society: religious Zionists, Haredim, secular Israelis, Mizrahim, and Ashkenazim.
Israel also understands the economic importance of this project. If in the past Israel hesitated for fear of triggering boycotts or the suspension of trade or arms deals, such concerns no longer drive its decisions. Amid two years of genocide in Gaza, the US supplied roughly $22bn in military aid, and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange soared to record highs last year, outperforming global markets.
Israel’s genocide aims to destroy the very idea of national rights for the Palestinian people, from Gaza to the occupied West Bank. It is no longer a question of whether it is possible to establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank, when faced with the legal and military realities on the ground.
With hundreds of thousands of Israeli settlers spread across the occupied West Bank, and countless legal complications surrounding land ownership, the latest steps are designed to cement the fact that this is not temporary - and the state will not be able to reverse the measures already taken.
The dismantling of the Oslo framework and the prevention of Palestinian statehood create an important political opening for the Palestinian political imagination. Rooted in decades of promises of statehood, the current imagination can no longer hold, especially in light of the PA’s collapse. We need a serious internal Palestinian discourse about the future, and about the guiding principles of future leadership.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
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