Sudan crisis: How a parallel RSF government could destroy the nation
The crisis in Sudan remains profound, devastating and largely neglected by the international community. As the conflict persists and the suffering of the Sudanese people escalates, prospects for a resolution appear increasingly dim.
While this might superficially appear to be a confrontation between two warring factions, however, the underlying dynamics are far more complex–shaped by internal political cleavage and strategically instrumentalised by global actors to cast shadows over war governance in Sudan.
After the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) recently regained vast swathes of territory from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) - including Um Rawaba in North Kordofan, and major parts of Sennar, Gezira and Khartoum - army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan announced the imminent formation of a new government.
In his announcement during an address to civil political forces in Port Sudan, Burhan said the anticipated government could be “either a caretaker government or a wartime government”, with an objective to support the SAF in “freeing Sudan from rebels”.
His announcement was bolstered by the Sudanese foreign ministry releasing its roadmap for peace, which outlined several key steps, including the launch of an inclusive national dialogue, the formation of a transitional cabinet of independent technocrats, and constitutional amendments that secured broad support.
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The roadmap also noted: “Laying down arms and evacuating civilian objects are prerequisites for any talks with the rebels. No ceasefire will be accepted unless the siege on El Fasher is lifted, followed by the withdrawal of the RSF militia from Khartoum, West Kordofan, and the Darfur states.”
These developments come as the Sudanese Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Taqadom) recently dissolved into two separate coalitions with two different visions.
Opposition alliance
The majority of civilian factions formerly aligned with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), which was part of Taqadom, have declared the formation of a new political coalition dedicated to ending the war. Dubbed the Civil Democratic Alliance of Revolutionary Forces, this new entity is led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, reflecting a strategic realignment among civilian political actors.
Conversely, the majority of armed groups, alongside certain bodies that aligned with the FFC after the 2021 coup, have consolidated their position within an opposing alliance, which aims to usher in a parallel government within territories currently under the RSF’s control. Notably, the official name of this alliance was announced later at a conference in Nairobi as "Sudan Founding Alliance".
Composed of some FFC entities and several civil society groups, Taqadom was founded in October 2023 and had its inaugural conference the following spring in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. The coalition was dissolved earlier this month at a virtual meeting, amid a dispute over forming a parallel government. This was the result of well-coordinated engagement between the RSF and its allies in Taqadom that ceased to exist after its dissolution.
FFC, a pro revolution alliance, comprising democratic political parties and civil society groups, was established during Sudan's third revolution.
The Sudan Founding Alliance launched its inaugural session in Nairobi on 18 February, where leaders and allies of the RSF discussed a charter that would lay the groundwork for a parallel government.
Among the attendees were Abdelaziz al-Hilu, the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North; Ibrahim al-Mirghani, a leader in the Democratic Unionist Party; and National Umma Party leader Fadlallah Burma Nassir, whose attendance came as a shock, as his party opposes the formation of a parallel government.
Rabah al-Sadiq, a prominent figure in the National Umma Party, described Nassir’s participation as “political suicide for him and an attempt to slaughter the party”. The party also issued a statement noting that it “did not authorise” Nassir or any other member to represent it at the Nairobi conference.
Hilu addressed the session as a keynote speaker. “The cards of religion, tribe and ethnicity are just obstacles used by the ruling elites in Khartoum to exclude those outside the circle, and we want to put an end to this matter starting today,” he said.
A few hours after the inaugural session, Sudan’s foreign ministry condemned Kenya for hosting the conference, citing “disregard for its obligations under international law, the Charter of the United Nations, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”. The ministry separately denounced a massacre committed by the RSF in el-Geteina in White Nile State, which killed 433 people, including newborn babies.
Risk of secession
The Kenyan government was unapologetic, explaining that hosting the conference came in the context of supporting peace by providing a non-partisan platform for affected parties, and pointing to Kenya’s long history of conflict resolution within the continent.
Concerns that an RSF-backed government could struggle to gain international legitimacy may lead to the perception that this development is merely propaganda, and not a genuine threat to Sudan’s political stability. But multiple scenarios remain plausible, and the events in Nairobi underscore the Sudanese political system’s inability to independently resolve its crises.
Ushering in a parallel government during an active conflict would signal a serious risk of secession, potentially leading to Sudan’s second partition, following the independence of South Sudan in 2011. But the circumstances today differ significantly.
A new history of fragmentation - another tale of a country with two governments - was thus set in motion
South Sudan achieved independence through a peaceful referendum in which its people exercised their right to self-determination, resulting in Sudan’s loss of a historically and politically significant region. Any future secession within Sudan would likely come at an immense cost, driven by violent conflict and significant human suffering.
Establishing a new government in RSF-controlled areas would not only challenge the political authority of the country’s Port Sudan-based government, but also potentially exacerbate ethnic tensions, escalating into widespread violence that could threaten the nation’s stability and pave the way for a new war.
Despite these challenges, Sudan still has an opportunity to maintain national cohesion and preserve its unity. Achieving this will require strong political will, a heightened sense of national responsibility, and a commitment to prioritising the collective interests of the country and its citizens in seeking a sustainable resolution to the ongoing crisis.
Ultimately, the responsibility for ending this war rests primarily with the Sudanese people - particularly civilians - as long as the international community remains disengaged. Amid significant shifts in the global geopolitical order, the likelihood of substantive external intervention is dubious.
Despite various indications pointing to the failure of a parallel government, Sudan will never be the same after the Nairobi conference. A new history of fragmentation - another tale of a country with two governments - was thus set in motion.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
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