Syria after Assad: Sharaa's delicate balancing act with Israel

The fall of the Assad regime last December, and the subsequent rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s administration, have ignited speculation about a potential normalisation of relations between Syria and Israel. 

This speculation has intensified with US President Donald Trump’s return to the White House, where he is likely to intensify his efforts to convince more nations to normalise relations with Israel.

Late last year, Sharaa addressed Israel for the first time, condemning the Israeli army’s incursions into Syrian territories. Referencing Israeli violations of the 1974 ceasefire deal with Syria, he pledged that Damascus would abide by that agreement, and contended that the downfall of the Assad regime had ended what Israel claimed was the threat of Iran-backed armed groups.

Sharaa reiterated his message last month, asserting that the pretexts Israel had used to justify its actions in Syria were no longer valid. He reaffirmed Syria’s commitment to the 1974 ceasefire agreement and expressed readiness to receive UN forces.

While some observers have interpreted these statements as signs of a possible detente with Israel, a closer examination reveals that normalisation remains a distant and improbable prospect. 

Despite the shifting rhetoric, the structural, political and historical barriers to normalisation are insurmountable in the current context. Although some in Israel and the US might want normalisation, the realities on the ground make it near-impossible for several reasons.

Any move towards normalisation would be perceived as a betrayal of Syria’s national sovereignty and a concession to an occupying power. For an administration still in the process of consolidating its authority, such a step could undermine its domestic legitimacy and credibility. 

Deep scars

The scars of the conflict run deep, and the notion of engaging with Israel is anathema to many Syrians, who view resistance to occupation as a core national value.

Moreover, normalisation would exacerbate fractures within Syrian society. The country is still reeling from years of war, and its social fabric remains fragile. Engaging with Israel would create a new fault line between those who prioritise pragmatism and economic recovery, and those who see resistance to Israel as a non-negotiable principle. 

Such polarisation could further destabilise the country, hindering reconstruction efforts and potentially reigniting internal conflicts. 

Sharaa's statements on Israel can be interpreted as a strategic move to prioritise Syria's internal stability and reconstruction over engaging in conflict

Another critical factor is the potential shift in priorities that normalisation could trigger. For many Syrians, the liberation of the Golan Heights remains a central national goal; however, the priority now is to rebuild the nation, and to achieve stability and prosperity. Normalisation could rally a segment of society that prioritises confronting Israel over rebuilding the country. 

This could ultimately lead to the resurgence of armed groups or the emergence of new resistance movements, diverting resources and attention away from essential efforts to rebuild the country. For a nation in desperate need of stability and development, such a shift would be counterproductive, and could derail the fragile progress made since the end of the war.

Regional dynamics further complicate the prospects for normalisation, which could provide an opportunity for Iran to reestablish itself in Syria. Similarly, other regional powers, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, could intervene to shape the outcome, adding another layer of complexity to an already volatile situation. 

Israel’s own policies and preferences also present a major obstacle. Normalisation is not a one-sided process. Historically, Israel has not abided by most UN Security Council resolutions, and even when it enters into agreements with other nations, it typically fails to fulfill its commitments. 

In the case of Syria, there has been no indication that Israel is willing to return the occupied Golan Heights or to address Syrian sovereignty issues. Without meaningful steps from Israel, normalisation remains a non-starter.

Strategic dominance

Moreover, Israel might prefer a fragmented Syria, as this allows it to maintain strategic dominance in the region and control over the occupied Golan Heights, without having to contend with a unified adversary. 

Normalisation would necessitate significant measures from Israel, such as returning occupied territories, which it has shown no willingness to undertake. Instead, Israel is likely to favour the status quo, where Syria remains preoccupied with internal challenges and unable to assert itself regionally. This preference for a weakened Syria undermines any genuine effort towards normalisation.

Sharaa’s statements on Israel can be interpreted as a strategic move to prioritise Syria’s internal stability and reconstruction over engaging in conflict. This approach suggests that the new administration recognises the futility of initiating conflict with Israel at a time when Syria’s military capabilities are severely diminished following years of war and Israeli aggression.

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Sharaa’s rhetoric also reflects an understanding that a confrontation with Israel would not only fail to achieve a clear victory, but could also exacerbate Syria’s internal divisions and hinder efforts to rebuild the nation and gain international recognition and legitimacy. 

This pragmatic stance allows Syria to focus on consolidating its authority domestically, while avoiding actions that could cause international isolation. In this context, Sharaa’s statements are less about signalling openness to normalisation, and more about creating a stable environment for Syria’s recovery - a necessary precondition for any future negotiations or confrontations with Israel.

Furthermore, Sharaa’s emphasis on the removal of Iran-backed armed groups from Syrian territory serves a dual purpose. It reassures regional actors and the international community that Syria is no longer a conduit for Iranian influence, while also distancing the new administration from the policies of the Assad regime. 

This shift could pave the way for improved relations with regional and global powers, which are essential for Syria’s rebuilding. But it also underscores the delicate balancing act that the Sharaa administration must maintain: avoiding conflict with Israel, while addressing the demands of a population that views resistance to occupation as a core national value. 

In this sense, Sharaa’s statements are a calculated effort to navigate the complexities of Syria’s postwar realities, with an eye towards long-term stability rather than immediate confrontation.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.