Is Syria inspiring a new Islamist revival?
I asked several activists, experts, and leaders of Islamic organisations whether the events in Syria could mark the beginning of a new revival of Islamism in the region.
It is important to clarify that Islamism is distinct from Islam. It refers to a political ideology that proposes models of political and social organisation based on Sharia, as well as a social movement engaged in political mobilisation in the name of Islam.
My motivation for this question was to reassess my earlier assertion about the "failure of Islamists in the region" and the supposed end of political Islam.
The steady decline in Islamists' popularity over the past decade is evident in the second wave of the Arab Spring (2018–2019), which erupted against Islamists in Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon, and, to a lesser extent, Algeria.
This underscored the distinction between their political actions and religious discourse.
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However, Syria's developments introduce a new dimension, compelling a fresh examination of the future of Islamism in the region.
'Cautious optimism'
A senior figure in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood residing in Turkey remarked:
Syria has rekindled hope in those exhausted by long struggles with no end in sight. The seemingly impossible has happened: a strong ruler from the post-World War Two era, backed by a powerful army, security services, regional allies, and Shia militias, has been toppled. The regime's return to the Arab fold, despite failing to meet demands to distance itself from Iran, underscores this shift.
Meanwhile, a leader of Morocco's Justice and Development Party noted Syria's continued instability and the dilemma posed by the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham [HTS] leader: "[Ahmed al-Sharaa] has yet to settle on a clear ideological position. If his stance remains ambiguous, how can his supporters in HTS adapt to his shifting political and intellectual trajectory?"
Islamists have yet to engage meaningfully with economic justice, a pillar of the Arab uprisings, alongside freedom and human dignity
His concern stems from the fact that Syrian Islamists have primarily engaged in an existential struggle against the regime rather than pursuing a democratic strategy to build a modern state. The Moroccan leader believes that "adopting the idea of a modern state cannot develop in an environment like Syria nor within the Eastern Islamic structure".
A young leader from the 2011 Egyptian uprising, who left the Brotherhood and was later exiled, remarked: "Syria has the potential to inspire a regional revival, for Islamists and others alike. Many friends from different backgrounds feel re-energised, though concerns about Syria's future remain."
A Maghreb Islamist leader describes the general mood among Islamists as one of "cautious optimism", yet notes that "everyone is generally pleased with the fall of the Syrian regime, especially after the full extent of its human rights violations became clear."
Despite this sense of jubilation, there has so far been a lack of in-depth analysis of the event's implications and its future impact.
The Maghreb leader observes:
There are no profound assessments; instead, there is widespread consumption of what is published by certain journalists and researchers, with implicit references to the need to draw lessons from the Syrian case - towards greater political openness, democratisation, and addressing unresolved human rights issues… Additionally, Turkey's significant role as a major player in the region has begun to take shape.
These are some of the perspectives I gathered from activists and experts. If I were to provide some insights on this topic, I would highlight five key aspects that help explain the evolving role of Islamism in the region.
Islamist struggles
The first is how struggle has shaped the trajectory of Islamism, as reflected in significant events over the past few years.
Since 2021, three pivotal events have shaped the agenda of Islamist movements: the Taliban's success in forcing the United States and Nato into a humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan; the Al-Aqsa Flood operation in October 2023; and the armed entry of HTS into Damascus at the end of last year.
These events highlight three key areas of Islamist engagement: ending foreign occupation, resisting the western-backed Zionist settler project, and overthrowing authoritarian regimes.
Yet significant challenges persist.
Islamists have yet to engage meaningfully with economic justice, a pillar of the Arab uprisings, alongside freedom and human dignity.
The new Syrian authorities have embraced a market economy, but without addressing deep-rooted inequality. The goal of this decision was rapid integration into the regional and international economies, yet without a clear plan to address the longstanding problem of unequal distribution - a problem that the market economy is likely to exacerbate.
Furthermore, the relationship between anti-occupation struggles, the Palestinian cause, and the fight against tyranny remains blurred.
A significant aspect of the public debate centres on differing perspectives: some contend that the fall of the Assad regime would mark the collapse of a key resistance stronghold, undermining the Palestinian cause, while others argue that the liberation of Palestine must be pursued alongside the struggle against tyranny.
One of the fundamental challenges facing the "axis of resistance" is its association with authoritarianism, as exemplified by the Bashar al-Assad regime. A rarely discussed issue, highlighted by a former editor-in-chief of Egypt's Al-Ahram newspaper, is what assurances the new authority in Damascus might have offered Washington (via Turkey) regarding Israel.
All past experiments in states that adopted Islamism as their guiding ideology - whether revolutionary (Iran), electoral (post-2012 Turkey), through a coup (Sudan), or in a traditional form (Saudi Arabia) - have failed.
Yet Islam continues to hold a powerful appeal in the region today.
Furthermore, the way various Islamic movements navigate the multiple crises facing the region in the coming years will shape the long-term role of religion.
Evolving religiosity
In my view, four key factors will define the relationship between Islamism and the region's realities: national independence, the Palestinian cause, the fight against pervasive tyranny in all its forms, and the fair distribution of resources, opportunities and wealth - namely, the ability to achieve an economic breakthrough that takes this dimension into account.
Today's religiosity is individualistic, shaped by social networks, activism, and direct experience rather than ideological doctrine
These events - along with others anticipated in the near future - reflect a growing trend towards religiosity among Arab youth, albeit without a clear action plan.
Al-Aqsa Flood, as I previously observed, underscores an increasing inclination among Arabs under 30 to reconnect with religion and actively engage in religious rites. I believe that developments in Syria may further reinforce this rising trend.
This raises an important question: what is the relationship between this trend and the religiosity of established organisations and groups, given their historical predicament? Have these young men and women managed to transcend - both organisationally and ideologically - the major Islamic movements, or are they still entrenched in traditional ideas, organisational structures, and practices?
In the wake of the uprisings, alternative religious and cultural models have emerged with a distinct character, diverging from established Islamic organisations. Over time, these alternatives have significantly reshaped roles once occupied by traditional groups, all without crystallising into rigid organisations.
Recent events have reignited religious sentiment among Arab youth, though without a coherent political or social agenda.
Unlike older Islamist movements, today's religiosity is individualistic, shaped by social networks, activism, and direct experience rather than ideological doctrine. It is also marked by strong female participation.
One former Islamist leader suggested: "Syria offers an opportunity for new Islamists to organise differently from traditional groups. It could encourage dialogue and re-evaluation of concepts like revolution, change, and even the use of force against oppressive regimes."
In his view, the Syrian events could "revitalise other Islamic groups and inspire hope, potentially fostering dialogue among different factions".
He adds that it also encourages "a reassessment of concepts that have been overlooked or overshadowed by past events and prolonged isolation - such as religion, revolution, Islamism, change, and even the use of limited violence in response to state violence."
The religiosity of post-Arab Spring university students is inherently individual, shaped more by networks of interaction and grassroots initiatives than formal organisations.
I fear the emerging model may ultimately rely on armed strength to force change, as all other avenues for reform remain firmly blocked
As researcher Mohamed Fattouh's pioneering study notes, it is driven by Islamic scholarship and sentimental Sufism, emerging through social media and direct engagement rather than ideological discourse.
It features a strong female presence, while its political stance remains fluid, shaped by major events rather than predefined doctrines. This new relationship with religion is rooted in freedom, choice, and conviction - free from the authority of sheikhs, sects, organisations, or inherited traditions.
Religion is being rediscovered through lived experience rather than theoretical debate. This revival has not been sparked by new religious discourse, traditional scholarship, or the slogans of political Islam, but by the fervour and resilience seen in Gaza, the opening of Damascus, and the overthrow of the Assad regime - led by the so-called new revolutionaries and jihadists.
This religiosity is embodied in daily practices rather than ideological indoctrination. Faith is interpreted pragmatically, focusing on its personal and functional role in confronting reality rather than its intellectual or doctrinal dimensions.
Pragmatic Islamism
The discourse presented by al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) exemplifies this pragmatic shift. His rhetoric differentiates between revolution and state-building, organisations and institutions.
Notably, he avoids references to Sharia implementation or the Islamic state - once central to Islamist discourse - focusing instead on local governance in Syria.
This shift raises questions: Will this emerging religiosity produce a more pragmatic Islamist movement? Or will it remain a loosely defined revival with no clear strategic direction?
The growing detachment from traditional religious institutions is also notable. Young activists are less inclined to follow clerical authority, instead drawing inspiration from grassroots movements and social media influencers.
This shift redefines the link between religiosity and politics, with faith serving as moral and ideological motivation rather than rigid doctrine.
The experience of HTS in Idlib marks a shift from Salafi-jihadist ideology as it increasingly engages in local governance. This shift is driven by practical necessity rather than ideology, with the new government delegated to civilian elites due to resource constraints.
It also facilitates the inclusion of technocrats and young revolutionary leaders. As I have previously argued, Islamic movements often lack a concrete political and economic framework, which is easily set aside when faced with the realities of governance.
Shifting positions
Western powers and regional allies have recently engaged in negotiations with groups they once labelled as terrorists.
The Taliban secured US withdrawal through direct negotiations. Saudi Arabia engaged the Houthis after suffering attacks on its oil infrastructure. Even Israel now negotiates with Hamas, an organisation it describes as "terrorist" - via Qatar, Egypt, and the US.
These shifts expose the political flexibility of the 'terrorist' label, raising questions about the future status of Islamist movements
Similarly, al-Sharaa - once designated a terrorist - has been rehabilitated following his role in Assad's downfall. Western and regional governments, including the EU and Egypt, have engaged with his administration in Damascus.
These shifts expose the political flexibility of the "terrorist" label, raising questions about the future status of Islamist movements.
Could these and similar examples prompt Arab regimes to reconsider their designation of certain Islamic groups as terrorist organisations? After all, they are now engaging with Syria's new leadership, have previously accepted Taliban rule, and remain unable to move beyond Hamas following the temporary truce agreement.
The integration of Islamists into their national contexts was another key outcome of the Arab Spring, as their rise to power and political competition forced them to prioritise national interests over Islamic internationalism.
Despite efforts to sway him otherwise, al-Sharaa acknowledges the need to reinforce this national orientation among Syrian Islamists at the expense of the internationalist ideology that defined their movement throughout the 20th century - or at the very least, to reinterpret it through a national lens.
A defining aspect of the Syrian experience is that groups like Ahrar al-Sham and HTS, despite engaging in armed struggle against the Assad regime and, in the case of HTS, having ideological and organisational roots in al-Qaeda, have developed a distinctly local strategy.
Their objectives and justifications remain tied to the Syrian context, focused primarily on confronting the Assad regime.
Beyond traditional ideology
The Syrian experience, like Al-Aqsa Flood, suggests a shift beyond traditional ideological frameworks.
It transcends traditional ideologies, moving beyond the old polarisation centred on the "obsession with Islamism".
Established elites once relied on these divisions to maintain their influence. Still, this shift may pave the way for Islamic responses that lack rigid ideological frameworks and ties to traditional organisations.
A striking trend is how regional and international backers of Syria seek to strip actors of their Islamic label rather than directly confronting their radical elements. This is done through containment, sanctions, and managing aid flows in the wake of the former regime's devastation - similar to the approach taken with Hamas, albeit with a more exclusionary stance.
These dynamics further expose the inability of traditional Islamic organisations to intellectually, organisationally, or politically address new societal realities and seismic geopolitical shifts. At the same time, they have reignited the debate on the intersection of religiosity and politics.
Young generations are redefining political engagement through innovative methods.
Following Al-Aqsa Flood, Israeli narratives were challenged, boycotts became a form of resistance linking consumer choices to politics, and grassroots fundraising for Palestinians gained momentum.
These efforts align with what I have termed "post-politics" or "minor politics", yet their potential to disrupt state power is evident - as seen in Kenya, Bangladesh, Senegal, and, most recently, Syria.
The new wave of devout individuals is entering politics through multiple avenues, demonstrating how easily religiosity translates into political action.
This poses a challenge for Arab regimes, which have built their strategies on depoliticising society. A key tactic has been to separate Islamism from politics, yet events continue to reaffirm their deep connection rather than any true division.
The real dilemma for these regimes is the rise of an intense religiosity increasingly tied to the public sphere, growing stronger by the day but lacking formal channels for meaningful reform.
I fear the emerging model - exemplified by the Taliban, Hamas, and HTS - may ultimately rely on armed strength to force change, as all other avenues for reform remain firmly blocked.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
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