No one wants a regional nuclear race on steroids, that's why freezing Iran's nuclear programme makes sense
The positive feedback from the first round of "indirect" talks between the US and Iran held in Muscat, Oman, last week presents a renewed opportunity to contain the military prospects of the Iranian nuclear programme.
It may also revive, at a later stage, the efforts of disarmament in the Middle East, including the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone. The missile/delivery systems capabilities of Iran may be addressed in that broader context.
According to recent press reports, Iran has reached a point where it would be able to manufacture a nuclear weapon within a week. Shortening this breakout time, without necessarily building such a weapon, has been Tehran’s objective since launching its clandestine nuclear programme.
I heard this firsthand from a high-ranking Iranian official during negotiations over the Iran nuclear deal in 2015. At the time, Iran was between 15 and 18 months away from manufacturing a nuclear weapon if it decided to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and focus on that objective, the official told me.
Iran says it was compelled not to declare certain activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after some Iranian facilities and scientists involved in the agency’s inspections were targeted by sabotage and assassinations. Tehran accused western and Israeli intelligence services of orchestrating the attacks.
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On the other hand, Israel, the US and the broader West have accused Iran of pursuing nuclear military objectives all along in an effort to destroy Israel, expand Iranian influence and export the Shia revolution across the Middle East.
Regardless of the veracity of the opposing claims, there was an opportunity to control the nuclear programme in 2015 - and it was the US, not Iran, that ultimately withdrew from the agreement.
The unravelling of the deal - which had been championed by the moderate wing of the Iranian regime, the EU and the Obama administration - enabled Iran to withdraw from its special safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and accelerate its efforts to shorten the breakout period.
The reality now is that over the last decade, its breakout time has been shortened dramatically, and Iran is in a position to manufacture a limited number of nuclear devices within a relatively short time, should it choose to do so. This latter point is important, because the official position of Iran’s supreme leader is that Islamic law forbids acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Tumultuous years
Iran did not start its nuclear programme from scratch after the 1979 revolution. On the contrary, the programme was started with the encouragement of the US in the late 1960s/early 1970s, under the imperial regime of the Shah, in order to strengthen Iran’s regional status as an ally to both the US and Israel.
The US turned a semi-blind eye to Iran’s quiet pursuit of nuclear deterrence back then. The programme was frozen for a limited period during the first tumultuous years of the Iranian revolution, but resumed gradually in the 1980s after things settled down and the new regime felt threatened by the Iran-Iraq War and the unfriendliness displayed by the West and many of its neighbours - notwithstanding the reasons behind this mutual hostility.
A freeze on Iran's nuclear programme would require many compromises from both sides, including Iran accepting a strict verification process
Since the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, a number of factors have led to renewed debate on Iran’s official prohibition on nuclear weapons, including the participation of Iran’s regional non-state allies in supporting Hamas in Gaza militarily; Israel’s retaliation; the back-and-forth direct confrontations between Israel and Iran; the weakening of Iran’s allies, notably Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis; and the mounting threats to Iran by both Israel and the US.
Have Iran and its regional reach been weakened to the extent that Tehran must consider the ultimate option to deter any potential aggressor and protect the country and the regime? I use “deter” here because after the first and only use of nuclear weapons in human history, the US attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War Two, the common doctrine is that nuclear weapons are not meant for actual use, but for deterrence purposes only.
Even when Israel considered using its nascent nuclear capabilities in October 1973, facing a quasi-existential threat from the surprise attack by Egypt and Syria, it opted not to, after the US came to its rescue with conventional weapons and political might.
Insurance policy
For Iran, the weaponisation of its nuclear programme might be seen as an effective insurance policy against regime change or total destruction - a method that has been successful for other countries that have developed nuclear military capabilities outside of, or in spite of, the global non-proliferation system, including Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan and North Korea.
The dismantling of Iran’s missile capabilities, which comprise potential delivery systems for nuclear weapons, has been a consistent objective of Israel and the West for decades.
But while the potential weaponisation of its nuclear programme is prohibited by the NPT, its missile capabilities do not fall under any international legal obligation. Yet, this does not prevent the possibility of addressing the missile capabilities at a later stage, in a broader context of reciprocal steps for transparency and disarmament in the region, with adequate security guarantees.
Freezing the Iranian nuclear programme in its current state appears to be the only achievable option that would have a positive outcome for all: the US, Iran, Israel, the region and the world. For the US and Israel, it would achieve the main objective of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
It could spare the region and the world a war with unprecedented levels of destruction; devastating economic repercussions in an already toxic international setting; and disastrous environmental impacts in a vulnerable region. For Iran, it could save the country from a potentially incapacitating attack by the US, which would risk fuelling internal calls for regime change.
As the best realistic option, a freeze on Iran’s nuclear programme would require many compromises from both sides, including Iran accepting a strict verification process, and the US and Israel giving up on the unrealistic idea of completely dismantling Iran’s nuclear programme - bearing in mind that the destruction of the infrastructure by force does not wipe out the scientific knowledge acquired over decades, and thus does not prevent Iran from trying again with more determination.
The alternative scenario of escalation and military confrontation would surely lead to catastrophe, destroying any chance of regional - if not global - peace and security for decades to come. More importantly, it would only accelerate Iran’s drive to acquire a nuclear weapon, triggering a regional nuclear race on steroids.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
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