Why talking to Trump is a tricky thing for Iran
US President Donald Trump's offer of dialogue with Iran without preconditions - which was quickly walked back by his secretary of state - has put the ball in Iran's court once more. Many believe this is a golden opportunity for Tehran to stroke Trump's ego and divert him from his path of confrontation by simply giving him a symbolic victory.
But for Tehran - unlike Trump's other bullying victims – making America look good is often the costliest concession that could be demanded of it.
Talking to Trump is a tricky thing for Iran. Even prior to Trump's public offer for unconditional talks last week, he had made no less than eight requests to meet with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. At first Iran was confused. A senior Iranian official explained to me at the time that they didn’t know how to engage with the unpredictable Trump.
There was also the fear that Iran would look weak. Rouhani had rejected a meeting with his predecessor Barack Obama even after the nuclear deal had been struck. If he then agreed to meet with Trump – after the American reality TV star's many insults against Iran and his refusal to respect America’s obligations under the Iran nuclear deal – he’d open himself up for scathing criticism from all sides.
Yet, Tehran also realised that if Trump truly wanted a new deal, Iran could get a better deal with him compared to Obama. Contrary to the accusations of the Congressional Republicans, Obama was a fierce negotiator while Trump clearly is more concerned with the appearance rather than the reality of a victory.
Many believe this is a golden opportunity for Tehran to stroke Trump’s ego and divert him from his path of confrontation by simply giving him a symbolic victory
But that is exactly what is so challenging for Tehran. Most countries faced with Trump's antics have had no difficulty playing to his ego by praising him, making him look good, and giving him a symbolic victory in order to secure substantive concessions in return.
In 2017, the EU was toughening its tone against Iran on regional issues while encouraging Trump to point to the EU's "new" stance in order to declare victory, but refrain from killing the nuclear agreement. The EU even encouraged Trump to claim that his pressure on NATO powers had forced them to increase their defence spending (which they hadn’t).
Trump took the bait. For Europe, it was better to look as if they had been defeated by Trump rather than actually having succumbed to him on the substance of the matter.
Japanese diplomats told me earlier last year how they had ensured Trump's recommitment to providing Japan with a nuclear umbrella without demanding an increase in Japanese defence spending. For three days, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe played golf with Trump at Mar a Lago and spent most of that time praising his golf resort, wealth and business acumen.
Making Trump and America look good and superior came at little to no cost to the Japanese.
But this is where Iran differs dramatically: to Tehran, concessions that would make America - and Trump - look good and give the impression of Iran submitting itself to America, even if only symbolically, are the costliest.
Iran has long insisted that it would only negotiate with the US as an equal and with "mutual respect".
These requirements have both cultural, historical and political explanations. From the US' masterminding of the 1953 coup against Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mossadeq, to the 1964 Status of Forces Agreement that granted US military personnel stationed in Iran and their dependents full diplomatic immunity, to Washington's backing of the Shah's brutal rule, the Iranians have felt a deep sense of humiliation by the United States. Washington has treated Iran as an inferior power, in their view.
Because of Iran’s factionalised politics, rivaling politicians also have incentives to portray those who engage with the US as having submitted to Trump – even if they haven’t
As a result, a central objective has been to only engage in talks that restore Iran's dignity and force the US to treat Iran as an equal. Any concession to Trump that would hint of Iranian submission – even if only symbolic - would be treated as capitulation in Iran.
Which brings us to the political factors: Iran’s politics makes it very difficult for any politician to accept going to the negotiating table with Trump if that entails a risk of Trump pulling a publicity stunt that either would be treat Iran as an inferior or be perceived as him trampling on Iranian dignity.
This would be political suicide for any Iranian politician. But because of Iran’s factionalised politics, rival politicians also have incentives to portray those who engage with the US as having submitted to Trump – even if they haven’t.
This, however, doesn’t mean Iran cannot show Washington respect.
Throughout the nuclear talks, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif repeatedly referred to the United States as his partner. Speaking of Washington as a partner was a clear break from past Iranian rhetoric and signalled significant respect.
But partnership also connotes equality, meaning Iran was only ready to treat Washington with respect within a relationship defined by equality.
And the preparatory work that preceded this language from Zarif was extensive, particularly the secret meetings Washington and Tehran held in Oman and New York throughout 2013 - not to mention Obama’s own efforts to speak about Iran with respect in public, even when Obama faced immense pressure from Israel, Saudi Arabi and members of Congress to be "tougher" against Iran.
These historic and political sensitivities may make a Trump-Rouhani handshake quite unlikely in the months and years ahead. But Tehran would be wise to avoid only focusing on the potential risks with Trump’s extended hand while neglecting its benefits.
Though any deal with Trump may have little value due to his unreliability, Tehran can also use that unreliability to its own advantage. The mere image of Trump and Rouhani shaking hands and speaking in private will spread panic in Riyadh and Tel Aviv – precisely because these allies of Trump know that they too cannot rely on him.
Their deep-seated fear of being betrayed by America in any US-Iran dialogue will reach a breaking point and likely cause a significant weakening of the concerted US-Israel-Gulf effort to break Iran. Ultimately, that would make Iran look good, not Trump.
- Trita Parsi is author of Losing an Enemy – Obama, Iran and the Triumph of Diplomacy and President Emeritus of the National Iranian American Council.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
Photo: A profile of US President Donald Trump and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani (AFP)